bullet_in_the_head_by_pierre5454

Internalisation: what exactly is it good for?

 

Here’s the thing. We need to know what happens inside people’s heads. Damage our brains and this will almost certainly affect our mental and bodily health. Yet looking inside people’s heads won’t tell us all we want to know about the mind. Crucially, in order to understand what we mean when we talk about mentality or cognition, we need to instead examine the sorts of things people say and do and the types of practices and contexts that shape people’s behaviours. Calling yourself an enactivist means signing up to this idea.

I’m just back from an excellent workshop on enactivism organized by Fred Muller at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Caterina Dutilh-Novaes (Groningen University) and Karim Zahidi (University of Antwerp) both gave excellent presentations which, in very different ways, raised the vexed issue of internalization, the idea that we internalize what is initially an external phenomenon.

For example, Caterina (https://sites.google.com/site/catarinadutilhnovaes/papers) defended her view that mathematical proof is a dialogical notion. The point of a proof, she claimed, is explanatory persuasion. Proofs can thus be characterized as having two participants with opposing goals: on the one hand, the prover, whose goal is to establish a conclusion, and on the other hand, the skeptic, whose goal (predictably enough) is to block that conclusion. Yet why don’t proofs look like dialogues? This is because the job of the skeptic has become part of the method of writing a proof. I understood this to mean that, according to Caterina, the role of the skeptic has been internalized during the formulating and writing of the proof.

In his talk, Karim (https://www.academia.edu/16884109/Radically_Enactive_Numerical_Cognition) defended an enactive account of numerical concepts. First, he laid out his view that concepts are particular types of abilities. Second, he challenged, among other things, the claim that a great variety of animal species have numerical abilities and numerical concepts. For example, he distinguished number sensitivity from number concept possession, and argued that while many animals certainly have the former, it is much less clear who, apart from humans, actually have the latter. He also offered a direct perception account of the ability to sum sequences of stimuli across different modalities, as well as describing how one could begin to give a natural history of number concepts.

Karim also discussed calculation. He argued that calculation is an activity constituted by the manipulation of public representations (symbols on a page, for example). Mental calculation, on the other hand, is what occurs when we leave these public representations out. So even if something is in fact internalized when we mentally calculate, this something is not representational. A question which then came up in discussion was: what then is internalized?

As a card carrying enactivist, my own view is that talk of internalization, no matter from what quarter, is deeply problematic. But it occurs to me (as it has occurred to others) that ‘going wide’ about mentality will always meet resistance as long as it is thought that some mental phenomena just have to be internal. Mental calculation looks to be a prime example of this. Later Wittgenstein however can help enactivists fight this resistance.

Wittgenstein cambridge
Your man himself, as they say in Northern Ireland: Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Consider one of Wittgenstein’s many thought experiments:

“Let us imagine a god creating a country instantaneously in the middle of the wilderness, which exists for two minutes and is an exact reproduction of a part of England, with everything going on there in two minutes. Just like those in England, the people are pursuing a variety of occupations. Children are in school. Some people are doing mathematics. Now let us contemplate the activity of some humans during these two minutes. One is doing exactly what a mathematician in England is doing, who is just doing a calculation. – Ought we to say that this two-minute-man is calculating? Could we for example not imagine a past and a continuation of these two minutes, which would make us call the processes something quite different?” (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI -34)

Klagge’s (1995) description of Wittgenstein is helpful here:

“By pressing the question of what various human activities consist in, Wittgenstein hopes to demystify the mental – not by denying its existence, but by diagnosing and transcending our conception of it as an invisible reservoir. Instead of looking within the person, at the moment, for (the essence of) what constitutes, e.g. intending, expecting, or reading, we should concentrate on what leads to, surrounds, and follows from the experiences and movements with which we usually associate the activity.” (p472)

The idea then is this: when we wonder what it is that makes a given activity calculating, we encounter the primitive notion that there must be something occurring now (usually in our heads) that somehow infuses that activity with ‘calculating qualities’. Yet as Wittgenstein’s two-minute-man illustrates, strip away all context, past and future, and it becomes evident that nothing happening now (in the head, in the body, or even in the environment) makes an activity an example of calculation.

Later Wittgenstein also discusses at length the differences between calculation and mental calculation. For Wittgenstein, calculating with a pen-and-paper and mental calculation are distinguished by the different things people do and say. This of course renders the difference between these two activities one of behaviour. The twist Wittgenstein adds is that the concepts ‘mental calculation’ or ‘calculating in the head’, like many other concepts, are not about behaviour. As is well known, Wittgenstein understands the link between some concepts and behaviours as logical or grammatical. One way to understand this is to say that some concepts characterize behaviour in the sense of situating that behaviour within a particular historical socio-cultural practice. Concepts, moreover, can have primary and secondary uses. The secondary use shares important resemblances (‘looks’) with the primary use. Fogelin (1977) understands Wittgenstein to be saying that this is true of calculation, such that ‘mental calculation’ or ‘calculating in the head’ are secondary uses of the primary concept of calculation.

Together, these points – anti-presentism, the logico-grammatical link between concepts and behaviour, primary and secondary uses of concepts – provide a means to deny that mental calculation is ever internal. So, for example, when I am asked to compute a sum in my head, and in response, I furrow my brow, look pensive and give an answer, nothing that has happened inside my head at that moment explains what I just did. This is not to deny that changes may have occurred in my brain (or in my body) at that moment. What it is to deny however is that such changes capture why what I just did can be called calculating. Rather my action counts as a case of mental calculation because the secondary use of the concept of calculation is applicable to it. This secondary use characterizes my action, not through the identification of some narrow characteristic happening in me or near me at that moment, but by situating my action within the appropriate set of broader practices and techniques. This is a robustly naturalist account – it is firmly rooted in what we do and say when we calculate.

Of course, this is only the beginnings of such an account. Much more still needs to be said. Still, it confirms the merit in asking: internalisation, what exactly is it good for? The answer, I would suggest, is not much. Which raises the further question: how far can we apply this anti-internalisation agenda? To all mental phenomena? What about, say, dreams? I suspect that killing cognitivism once and for all is going to require us enactivists getting really radical…..

 

2 thoughts on “Internalisation: what exactly is it good for?”

  1. So all the work by the likes of Barsalou, Kosslyn, Anderson, Hesslow. Ganis et al., is all for not? So theories of neural reuse/redeployment of what ‘mental imagery’ consists in (vis. “top-down sensory-motor emulation”) are all bunk? What about the work on the reversal of signal flow in cortex when switching between visual vs. imagination driven tasks. The various parts of the brain typically involved in bottom-up processes (modal (sensory), vestibular, proprioceptive, some autonomic, etc., experience) are “reused/redeployed” top-down-wise (endogenously), to produce ‘mental imagery’- where’s the mereological fallacy in all that? Agreed that symbol shuffling and treating perception as representational is nonsense, but there’s no such thing as mental imagery? Really? I swear anti-representationalists are simply ‘weak visualisers’ exposed to too much eco-psychology.

    1. Thank you for your reply! Feedback is most welcome.

      In response to your comments, I would say, first, nowhere in my blog post do I claim that there is no such thing as mental imagery. Nor do I see any reason make such a claim. Mental imagery can of course can be given a suitably enactivist gloss. Second, Wittgenstein challenges internalisation, not talk of the Inner. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s later philosophical psychology could be/has been read as an attempt to reveal the full complexity of our inner lives. As such, he is not in the business of claiming that there are no inner experiences or no mental occurrences. These two points mean that, third, it is entirely unclear to me how your claims about mental imagery in fact relate to the points made by my blog post. Perhaps you can clarify?

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